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Abstract
Background: Nearly every nation in the world faces shortages of health workers in remote areas. Cameroon is no 
exception to this. The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) is currently considering several rural retention strategies 
to motivate qualified health personnel to practice in remote rural areas. 
Methods: To better calibrate these mechanisms and to develop evidence-based retention strategies that are 
attractive and motivating to health workers, a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) was conducted to examine what 
job attributes are most attractive and important to health workers when considering postings in remote areas. The 
study was carried out between July and August 2012 among 351 medical students, nursing students and health 
workers in Cameroon. Mixed logit models were used to analyze the data. 
Results: Among medical and nursing students a rural retention bonus of 75% of base salary (aOR= 8.27, 95% CI: 
5.28-12.96, P< 0.001) and improved health facility infrastructure (aOR= 3.54, 95% CI: 2.73-4.58) respectively were 
the attributes with the largest effect sizes. Among medical doctors and nurse aides, a rural retention bonus of 75% 
of base salary was the attribute with the largest effect size (medical doctors aOR= 5.60, 95% CI: 4.12-7.61, P< 0.001; 
nurse aides aOR= 4.29, 95% CI: 3.11-5.93, P< 0.001). On the other hand, improved health facility infrastructure 
(aOR= 3.56, 95% CI: 2.75-4.60, P< 0.001), was the attribute with the largest effect size among the state registered 
nurses surveyed. Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) estimates were generated for each health worker cadre for all the 
attributes. Preference impact measurements were also estimated to identify combination of incentives that health 
workers would find most attractive.
Conclusion: Based on these findings, the study recommends the introduction of a system of substantial monetary 
bonuses for rural service along with ensuring adequate and functional equipment and uninterrupted supplies. By 
focusing on the analysis of locally relevant, actionable incentives, generated through the involvement of policy-
makers at the design stage, this study provides an example of research directly linked to policy action to address a 
vitally important issue in global health.
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Implications for policy makers
• Based on a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) analyzed using mixed logit and Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) analysis, we recommend substantial 
monetary bonuses for rural service along with ensuring supplies and equipment for at least a basic package of health services to motivate health 
workers
• Classification of posts based on remoteness and tying level of bonuses to this may be necessary to attract health workers to the most rural areas
• Offering specialist training and housing, as proposed by the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) were less popular incentives across health 
worker cadres examined
• Focusing on actionable incentives and conducting locally relevant research are vital if findings are to influence policy-making
Implications for public
Attracting and retaining qualified health workers in rural areas is a formidable challenge in most developing countries and Cameroon is no 
exception to this. The lack of adequate health workers in rural areas is associated with poorer health outcomes. Our research sought to examine 
the strategies proposed by the Cameroonian Ministry of Public Health (MoPH)  that are popular in attracting health workers to rural Cameroon. 
The implementation of our recommendations that call for substantial monetary incentives for rural service, and ensuring availability of supplies 
for a basic set of services has the potential to attract a significant number of health workers to work in rural Cameroon, and mitigate the human 
resource crisis in the country. This in turn, may help reduce inequalities in health outcomes that are currently observed across different regions 
of Cameroon.
Key Messages 
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Background
Nearly every nation in the world faces shortages of health 
workers in rural areas. Ensuring professionally trained, 
motivated health professionals are present to provide essential 
health services in even the most challenging areas is an essential 
step in the path towards universal health coverage (1–3). Cross-
national evidence shows that staffing levels are closely linked 
with service delivery coverage and health outcomes (4,5). 
Within countries, areas with low densities of health workers are 
also often areas with the worst health outcomes. For example, 
the states in north central India with the lowest densities of 
health workers have the highest rates of infant mortality in the 
country (6). Though many other factors may be associated with 
poorer health in rural areas, the availability of adequate human 
resources for health appears to be an important contributor (7).
Policy-makers need better evidence to inform context-specific 
rural retention policies. Interventions to alleviate health 
worker shortages in medically underserved areas include 
initiatives such as: i) selective recruitment of individuals 
into healthcare education who are most likely to work in 
remote areas, ii) training specifically for serving in remote or 
challenging geographic zones, iii) improvements in working 
or living conditions in underserved areas, iv) compulsion, 
or v) incentives (8). The available evidence shows that wage 
bonuses, non-financial incentives, regulatory policies such as 
bonding, and preferential selection of students from rural areas 
into training programs can work to strengthen retention efforts 
(9). But there is no ‘magic bullet’ policy and there are just as 
many examples of failures as success. Since health worker 
motivation and job satisfaction are critical to their retention 
and performance (7,9,10), the development of appropriate 
strategies first requires an understanding of the factors which 
influence decisions to accept and/or stay in a remote post, and 
which strategies improve attraction and retention are therefore 
likely to be successful (9). Due to the complex interaction of 
factors impacting attraction and retention, there is a strong 
argument to be made for bundles of interventions which 
include attention to living environments, working conditions 
and environments, and career/professional development 
opportunities.
Health worker preferences for human resource policy 
interventions vary significantly across countries. In Kenya 
and South Africa, better educational opportunities or rural 
allowances were identified to be most effective in increasing the 
uptake of rural posts, while in Thailand better health insurance 
coverage was identified as having the most effect on rural 
health worker retention (11). Moreover, there is a substantial 
body of literature on why health workers choose not to locate 
in rural areas (including reasons such as low pay and poor 
promotion opportunities), what type of incentives they value 
most in a job, and how this varies by type of individual (9,12). 
But these types of studies do not provide respondents real life-
like job scenarios that allow for understanding the importance 
of various employment attributes of rural jobs that influence 
health worker decision-making behavior.
In this study, we investigate health worker preferences for 
a range of incentive strategies for retaining qualified health 
workers in remote areas of Cameroon. We use a Discrete Choice 
Experiment (DCE) to examine health worker retention strategy 
attributes that influence health workers’ stated preferences for 
employment opportunities in remote areas. To our knowledge, 
this is the first study to address health worker preferences for 
rural retention methods in Cameroon. It provides policy-
makers locally relevant, actionable information on what health 
workers in the country desire for health service delivery in 
rural areas of the country. By involving policy-makers from 
the design stage, we link research to policy development and 
action.
Cameroon context
With about 11 qualified health workers per 10,000 population, 
Cameroon has well below the estimated need of 22.3 qualified 
personnel per 10,000 population according to minimum 
criteria established by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
(13). Human resource management in Cameroon is highly 
centralized and lacks transparency (14). Centralized planning 
does not allow for adequate flexibility in responding to these 
needs. The majority of physicians in the country are based in 
urban areas and more than half of Cameroon’s health workforce 
is employed in three administrative regions: the Center, Littoral 
and West, which are home to the three largest cities in the 
country (Yaoundé, Douala, Bafoussam). On the other hand, 
the Far North region, which is home to 18% of the national 
population, employs only 8% of the country’s physicians. 
Similarly, 55% of public sector nurses are concentrated 
in the Center, Littoral, and West regions, which together 
represent only 42% of the population. The majority of health 
professionals in rural areas are nurse aids, the classification of 
professional health workers in Cameroon with the lowest level 
of technical training (two years) (13). These characteristics are 
particularly true in the three northern regions of Cameroon 
(Far North, North and Adamaoua), which are home to the 
poorest health outcomes in the country.
One of the major challenges in the Cameroonian health system 
is the inequity in access to, and use of, health services between 
urban and rural areas and across administrative regions. 
Almost every category of health indicator is worse for those 
who live in remote areas and regions (defined as those located 
more than 80km from the first referral hospital), and the gap 
has been increasing over the past decade (15–17). For example 
in the Northern region of Cameroon, in 2011 only 21.8% of 
births were attended by skilled personnel, compared to 93% 
in Littoral region and 91.6% in the West. Between 2004 and 
2011, coverage of assisted deliveries actually decreased in the 
Far North region, from 26.6% to 25.1% (15,16). At the national 
level, the maternal mortality ratio increased from 669 deaths 
per 100,000 live births in 2004 to 782 deaths in 2011 (15,16), 
slightly higher than countries such as Liberia and Sudan even 
if lower than neighboring countries such as Central African 
Republic and Chad (Figures 1 and 2). 
Recognizing the skewed distribution of the health workforce as 
a key impediment towards the achievement of universal health 
coverage, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) is currently 
developing several rural retention strategies to motivate 
qualified health personnel to practice in rural areas, including 
both financial and non-financial incentives. These include: i) 
rural retention bonuses, ii) preferential admission for additional 
training opportunities for health workers completing service in 
remote areas, and iii) guaranteed reassignment to urban areas 
after completion of rotational assignments in remote areas. To 
better calibrate these mechanisms and develop evidence-based 
retention strategies that are attractive and motivating to health 
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workers, the World Bank, in collaboration with the Direction 
of Human Resources (DHRs) at the MoPH and Institute for 
Survey and Statistical Analysis (ISSA), conducted a DCE to 
examine health worker preferences for rural job postings. 
Methods
The DCE is a technique that aims to elicit stated preferences 
of individuals. Random Utility Theory provides the theoretical 
foundation for DCEs (18). Utility is unobservable and must be 
inferred from the individual’s job choices. A utility maximizing 
individual will choose the job that he or she does, if and 
only if, the chosen job provides a higher level of utility than 
the alternative job (18). The probability that individual I will 
choose job j over job k can be written as:
Pij= P [Uij>Uik]
Pij = P [Vij+ εij>Vik + εik]
Pij = P [Vij - Vik>εik-εij] i≠j
By making assumptions about the distribution of the random 
component, choice models can be derived that can be analyzed 
using standard econometric techniques (7,18). Through asking 
respondents to choose between hypothetical alternatives, 
DCEs help understand an individual’s valuation of different 
attributes of a product, policy or program (19). One of the 
most common applications of DCEs is to inform policy related 
to retention of health workers in remote or hardship zones. 
Studies with this intention include those by Kolstad (20) in 
Tanzania, Mangham and Hanson (21) in Malawi, Kruk et al. 
(22) in Ghana, a multi-country study by Blaauw et al. (11), and 
by Vujicic et al. (7) in Vietnam. More recent papers include 
those by Rockers et al. (23) looking at job preferences of trainee 
health professionals in Uganda, by Rao et al. (6) examining 
job preferences of doctors, nurses, medical students and 
nursing students in two states of India and by Rockers et al. 
(24) examining preferences of nursing students and practicing 
nurses in the Lao PDR.
A systematic review by Mandeville et al. (25) of DCEs to inform 
health work policy was recently conducted and identified the 
importance across similar studies of rural allowances/bonuses 
and opportunities for further training for the uptake of rural 
posts, while time commitments were found to be generally 
unpopular. Araújo and Maeda (26) note that there are 
several limitations to conducting DCEs for human resources 
for health policy: i) there remains limited evidence on the 
reliability of DCEs when predicting labor force decisions; ii) 
the number of job attributes and levels within each attribute 
should remain limited (six to seven) to avoid cognitive burden 
to respondents; and iii) DCE survey respondents must trade 
off between attributes and apply compensatory decision 
rules. If respondents do not understand the choice exercise or 
make choices based on a single attribute, results may be invalid. 
Findings in this study are based on a survey carried out 
between July and August 2012 among medical students, 
nursing students and health workers in Cameroon. The 
study sample included seventh year medical students from 
the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Yaoundé I, third 
year State-Registered Nurse nursing students from one public 
and one private nursing school in Yaoundé, and public sector 
health professionals such as generalist doctors from Yaoundé, 
North and East regions, and state-registered nurses and nurse 
aides from the North and East regions. The North and East 
regions were chosen by the Director of Human Resources at 
the MoPH due to their critical shortages in retaining qualified 
health workers. The districts were selected in each region were 
chosen by the Regional Health Delegation for that region, 
based on their accessibility and presence of qualified staff at the 
facility. While random sampling was not conducted, an initial 
discussion was held with each Regional Health Delegation 
regarding the selection process of facilities to ensure that the 
sites selected were representative of the rural and isolated 
sites targeted by the proposed rural retention strategies. 
Administrative authorization for the study was provided by the 
MoPH.
As a first step, we carried out four focus group discussions to 
inform the study design. The 63 respondents included medical 
doctors, nurses, medical students and nursing students. These 
were held at the end of June 2012 at four locations in Yaoundé, 
namely the District Hospital Biyem Assi (12 participants), a 
public nursing school (14 participants), a faith-based nursing 
school (13 participants) and the Faculty of Medicine at the 
University of Yaoundé (13 participants). Respondents were 
asked to describe what they perceived as a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ 
job, both in terms of characteristics of the job and their 
expectations on each of the characteristics. Respondents 
were also specifically asked about working in rural areas and 
the incentives, both monetary and non-monetary that they 
would need to receive in return for working in a rural area. 
At the end of the discussions, respondents were presented and 
asked to rank seven attributes that were generated based on 
discussions with the MoPH and a review of the literature from 
other developing countries, they were also asked to provide 
Figure 1. Health worker density by region and sector, doctors.
Source: Health workforce census, 2011, DHR/MS
Figure 2. Health worker density by region and sector, nurses.
Source: Health workforce census, 2011, DHR/MS
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other attributes that they thought important and that were not 
in our list (Table 1). The final attributes were decided on the 
basis of the focus group discussions as well as discussions with 
senior officials in the Ministry of Health (Table 2). Baseline and 
baseline-plus-bonus salaries for students and health workers 
were estimated using official documents from the DHRs at the 
MoPH. Using these attributes, hypothetical job scenarios were 
generated. Respondents were asked to choose between a series 
of these scenarios each consisting of different attribute-level 
combinations.
Choice sets were generated using the Ngene software (27)
which created an orthogonal optimal in the differences 
design with no overlap of attributes (respondents were forced 
to trade off attributes) and attribute level balance (each 
attribute level occurred an equal number of times across the 
whole questionnaire), following the design principles and 
construction techniques put forward in Street et al. (28). This 
design ensures that respondents are compelled to trade across 
attributes throughout the experiment, while the orthogonality 
enables estimation of the influence of each of the attributes on 
the choice. The disadvantages of this design are that forcing 
attributes to be different across alternatives may enable a 
particular dominant attribute to drive an individual’s choices 
throughout the experiment and that this design may only be 
used in unlabeled DCEs (27).
The final orthogonal optimal in the differences design generated 
by the Ngene software had 24 choice sets with a D-efficiency 
of over 97%. While health applications generally have used 
smaller numbers of choice sets; the use of 32 choice sets per 
respondent has been identified in the broader literature, with 
as many as 28 used in health applications (18). Each choice set 
posed two questions to the respondent. First, the respondents 
were asked to choose between the two rural jobs. The second 
question varied according to the type of respondent. In order 
to provide an opt-out option, students were asked if they would 
actually take up the job that they chose if it were offered to 
them and health workers were asked if they would give up their 
current job for the job they selected in the questionnaire. For 
health workers, the last question of the survey asked them to 
characterize their current job in terms of the six attributes used 
to generate the choice sets (Figure 3).
Development of the attribute levels took into account responses 
from the qualitative study as well as the political and financial 
feasibility of hardship bonuses while deciding on the four 
levels of the salary attribute to be offered to the respondents. 
To take into account different salaries according to seniority, 
we described the salary attribute in terms of the respondents’ 
current salary plus a percentage increase of varying levels 
Table 1. Ranking job posting attributes, focus group discussion participants
Attribute
7 (Most 
important)
6 5 4 3 2 1 (Least 
important)
Total score*
Salary 30 16 5 6 4 1 1 370
Availability of housing for staff at health facility 5 19 15 6 6 6 6 284
Accessibility and connectivity of the workplace 11 10 13 8 5 8 8 273
Availability of drugs and equipment at the facility 4 11 9 16 14 8 1 262
Opportunities for career development 10 5 8 5 10 21 4 236
Sufficient personnel at health facility for workload 2 1 10 18 15 10 7 214
Possibility of job assignment in urban areas after a 
fixed period
1 1 3 4 9 9 36 125
Total respondents 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
*Total score = Scores were calculated by multiplying the number of respondents by the score per rank order (highest = 7 points, lowest = 1 point) and adding 
the total points per attribute
Table 2. Attributes and levels used in questionnaire design
Attribute Level Description
Accessibility and 
connectivity of the 
workplace to the city
1 Your facility is located in a village with poor connectivity - reliable transportation to the health district capital twice a week 
or less
2 Your facility is located in a village with good connectivity - reliable transportation to the health district capital every day
Health facility 
infrastructure
1 Lack of equipment, drugs and frequent shortages of inputs for most services that you are supposed to provide at the primary 
healthcare level (delivery, vaccination, prenatal consultation and general consultation)
2 Adequate equipment, drugs and rare shortages of inputs for most services that you are supposed to provide at the primary 
healthcare level (delivery, vaccination, prenatal consultation and general consultation)
Lodging
1 No accommodation provided (only an additional allowance for housing as currently given to you)
2 A good quality house is made   available in a secure location with access to drinking water (in addition to housing benefit 
being provided)
Career development
1  No preferential admission for health workers in rural areas for ongoing training available (placement exam with equal 
chances)
2 Establishment of preferential admission for ongoing training available to your level via a quota of 20% of seats reserved for 
those who worked for at least 4 years in rural areas
Salary (inc. all 
bonuses)
1 Your base salary at its current level
2 Your base salary at its current level + 25% rural retention bonus
3 Your base salary at its current level + 50%  rural retention bonus
4 Your base salary at its current level + 75%  rural retention bonus
Job assignment in an 
urban area 
1 Uncertain
2 Automatic after 3 years
Robyn et al.
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2015, 4(3), 169–180 173
for accepting to work in a rural hardship post. However, to 
provide a reference point for students, information on entry 
level salaries for doctors and state-registered nurses (including 
all benefits) was obtained from DHR and was used to generate 
the attribute levels. The highest level on the salary attributed 
corresponded to 75% of the respondent’s current salary 
(including all benefits) or, in the case of students, entry level 
salaries for their cadre (including all benefits). 
The questionnaire included one choice set, in addition to the 
24 generated by the software, where all attributes in one of the 
two job options were dominant and would be expected to be 
chosen by a rational respondent. This choice set was presented 
as choice set 15, and served as a test, enabling detection of 
respondents who were likely to have been randomly marking 
the questionnaire or did not understand how to complete 
the questionnaire. The questionnaire also included questions 
on background demographic characteristics of respondents, 
including age, gender, rural upbringing, marital status, 
education and work place characteristics (for currently 
active health workers). 
Mixed logit regression was used for the statistical analysis. 
These models allow for heterogeneity in preferences and 
also enable one to model repeated choices made by the same 
individual. They overcome a number of the restrictions of, 
and are therefore an improvement over models such as the 
conditional logit (22). All statistical analysis was done using 
Stata 11. For ease of understanding, all mixed logit coefficients 
were exponentiated and presented as Odds Ratios (OR).
Based on mixed logit estimates, Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) 
estimates for each of the attributes were generated (29). The 
WTP measure conveys in monetary terms, respondents’ 
preferences for rural job attributes or a combination of 
attributes or incentive mechanisms, relative to a standard rural 
job posting or reference level void of incentives (status quo). 
In order to obtain WTP estimates, each attribute coefficient of 
the mixed logit model was divided by the salary coefficient of 
the mixed logit model (29). Baseline and baseline plus bonus 
salaries for students and health workers were estimated using 
official documents from the DHRs at the MoPH. All WTP 
estimates use salary levels for civil servants and not contracted 
health personnel.
Preference impact measures were then estimated for different 
packages (27). This measure estimates the percentage of each 
cadre that would prefer that package, compared to the status 
quo for rural postings. In other words, the preference impact 
measure examines how combinations of different levels of 
attributes alters the likelihood that health workers and students 
would select a given job (29). These were calculated by taking 
the attribute coefficients from the mixed logit model results 
and using the following equation in Excel (29):
( )
( )
( )
( )
   
   
   
   1
proposed job preference value
standard job preference value
proposed job preference value
standard job preference value
e
e
e
e
 
 
 
  
+     
The job preference value is the sum of the mixed logit 
coefficients for all attributes that are included in the given job 
description, whether it be the proposed incentive package or 
status quo standard scenario. For this study, the status quo 
scenario includes the baseline level for each job attribute, as 
no incentives are currently being offered within the framework 
adopted for this DCE and the descriptive characteristics of 
the baseline scenario are largely representative of workplace 
settings for health workers in rural areas of Cameroon. 
Results
The study included a total of 351 respondents (Table 3). 
Medical doctors in Yaoundé were found to be difficult to have 
participate in the survey, leading to a smaller than expected 
sample from this group. Data collection in the other two 
regions proceeded smoothly, with the survey team using the 
launch of the Performance-Based Financing (PBF) project in 
the East Region to take advantage of the large number of health 
workers that were participating in the regional launching 
Example combination of choice: which of these jobs would you prefer? 
 
 
Job 1 
 
  Job 2 
Accessibility and 
connectivity of the 
workplace to the 
city 
Your facility is located in a village with poor 
connectivity - reliable transportation to the 
health district capital twice a week or less  
 Accessibility and 
connectivity of the 
workplace to the city 
Your facility is located in a village with good 
connectivity - reliable transportation to the 
health district capital every day 
Health facility 
infrastructure 
Lack of equipment, drugs and frequent shortage 
of inputs for most services that you are supposed 
to provide at the primary healthcare level 
(delivery, vaccination, prenatal consultation and 
general consultation) 
 Health facility 
infrastructure 
Lack of equipment, drugs and rare shortage of 
inputs for most services that you are supposed to 
provide at the primary healthcare level (delivery, 
vaccination, prenatal consultation and general 
consultation) 
Lodging 
 
A good quality house is made available in a 
secure location with access to drinking water (in 
addition to housing benefit being provided) 
 
 Lodging 
 
No accommodation provided (only an additional 
allowance for housing as currently given to you) 
Career 
development 
No preferential admission for health workers in 
rural areas for ongoing training available 
(placement exam with equal chances) 
 
 Career development Establishment of preferential admission for 
ongoing training available to your level via a 
quota of 20% of seats reserved for those who 
worked for at least 4 years in rural areas  
Salary (including all 
bonuses) 
Your base salary at its current level + 75%  rural 
retention bonus 
 
 Salary (including all 
bonuses) 
Your base salary at its current level  
Job assignment in 
an urban area 
Uncertain  Job assignment in an 
urban area 
Automatic after 3 years 
 
Which of these jobs would you prefer?        Job 1                                               Job 2   
Will you be ready to accept the job you have chosen         Yes                       No 
in place of your current job
Figure 3: Example choice set: health workers
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workshop. Health workers from all fourteen health districts in 
the region were present at the workshop and participated in the 
DCE. In the North, the districts of Garoua II, Pitoa and Guider 
were included in the survey, where 10 primary care facilities 
and two district hospitals health facilities were visited by the 
survey team. Descriptive statistics of the sample population 
are provided in Table 4. Two students, both nursing students, 
and eight health workers, chose the inferior job option for the 
test of dominance. This low rate of failure of the dominance 
test ruled out large scale cognitive fatigue on the part of the 
respondents that may be a potential problem in a study with 
24 choice sets.
Table 5 displays the number of respondents for each choice 
set who picked one of the two hypothetical jobs offered to 
them. For students, this figure represents the number of 
students who stated that they would take up the job that they 
chose if it were offered to them. For health workers this number 
represents those who would give up their current job to pick 
the job they selected in the questionnaire. 
Main effects regression analysis was done with and without 
individuals who failed the dominance test as a test of sensitivity. 
Findings were similar in significance and effect sign and these 
individuals were kept in the sample for subsequent analysis, in 
line with suggested best practice from the literature (18). 
Students
Table 6 shows the results of the main effects mixed logit model, 
displaying adjusted odds ratios for each of the attribute levels. 
All attribute levels were significantly different from zero. 
Among the sample of 45 medical students, a rural retention 
bonus of 75% of base salary was the attribute with the largest 
effect size (aOR= 8.27, CI: 5.28-12.96, P< 0.001). This was 
followed by the attribute good health facility infrastructure, 
defined in terms of adequacy of equipment, drugs and 
inputs for the provision of services at the primary care level 
(aOR = 5.94, CI: 3.73-9.47, P< 0.001). For the nursing students 
in the sample (n= 95), the regression coefficients for both 
good infrastructure (aOR= 3.54, CI: 2.73-4.58, P< 0.001) and 
guaranteed transfer (aOR= 2.81, CI: 2.22-3.56, P< 0.001) were 
of a larger magnitude than that associated with a 75% rural 
retention bonus (aOR= 1.80, CI: 1.42-2.29, P< 0.001). 
Interaction terms for gender and rural upbringing were each 
tested in a single model for each cadre. Among medical students, 
female gender had a positive effect on selecting a job with a 
guaranteed transfer (aOR= 5.52, CI: 2.54-12.03, P< 0.001). 
Respondents brought up in a rural area were significantly more 
likely to pick a job with better health facility infrastructure 
than those brought up in urban areas (aOR= 3.21, CI: 1.66-
6.20, P< 0.001). They were also significantly more likely to 
select a job with a guaranteed transfer (aOR= 2.80, CI: 1.50-
5.22, P< 0.001). Among nursing students, those brought up in 
a rural area were significantly more likely to take up a job with 
a guaranteed transfer (aOR= 1.68, CI: 1.00-2.81, P= 0.049). All 
remaining interaction terms were not statistically significant.
Health workers
Medical doctors (n= 77) had stated preferences similar to 
medical students (Table 7). A 75% rural retention bonus had 
the biggest effect size (aOR= 5.60, CI: 4.12-7.61, P< 0.001), 
followed by good health facility infrastructure (aOR= 3.76, 
CI: 2.88-4.90, P< 0.001). As with the students, accessibility of 
health facility to the district capital (aOR= 1.59, CI: 1.30-1.95, 
P< 0.001) and a 25% rural retention bonus (aOR= 1.91, CI: 
1.50-2.43, P< 0.001) were the attributes that had the smallest 
effect sizes.
In common with nursing students, the salary attribute was of 
a smaller magnitude than facility infrastructure for the group 
of practicing state-registered nurses (n= 74). The attribute, 
Table 3. Sample for quantitative phase
Medical students Nursing students Generalist doctors State-registered nurses/nursing aides
Centre region 45 (100)a 96 (100) 53 (100) 0 (0)
North region (Garoua II, Pitoa, Guider) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (0) 63 (50)
East region (all 14 districts) 0 (0) 0 (0) 22 (0) 73 (50)
Total 45 (100) 96 (100) 77 (100) 136 (100)
aTarget sample is given in parenthesis
Table 4. Descriptive statistics
Medical students Nursing students Medical doctors 
State-registered 
nurses 
Nurse aides 
Male (%) 71.12 21.09 67.52 70.29 64.44
Age in years (SDa) 25.14 (1.62) 26.04 (2.81) 38.83 (8.53) 40.89 (7.92) 39.50 (8.80)
Rural upbringing (%) 70.41 60.00 59.49 33.84 31.73
Married (%) 11.09 24.24 71.41 71.61 50.00
Have children (%) 24.49 40.00 76.62 89.22 86.75
Permanent employee (%) - - 85.74 66.23 56.69
Previously or currently worked at primary care level (%) - - 48.08 75.74 80.00
Mean years of government service  (SD) - - 9.63 (7.29) 13.11 (9.21) 12.10 (10.44)
Mean years worked at current health facility (SD) - - 4.12 (3.54) 5.34 (4.72) 5.30 (6.40)
Worked at remote health facility (%) - - 29.92 46.00 53.30
Centre region 45.00 95.00 53.00 0.00 0.00
North region (Garoua II, Pitoa, Guider) 0.00 0.00 2.00 30.00 31.00
East region (all 14 districts) 0.00 0.00 22.00 44.00 29.00
Total 45.00 95.00 77.00 74.00 60.00
1SD= Standard Deviation
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good health facility infrastructure had the largest effect size 
(aOR= 3.56, CI: 2.75-4.60, P< 0.001), followed by the highest 
salary attribute (aOR= 3.13, CI: 2.43-4.03, P< 0.001). For nurse 
aides (n= 60), a75% rural retention bonus (aOR= 4.29, CI: 3.11-
5.93, P< 0.001) had the largest effect size, while a guaranteed 
transfer after service in remote areas had no effect on job 
choice (aOR= 1.14, CI: 0.97-1.33, P= 0.107; Table 7). 
Table 5. Number of respondents who would pick one of the two hypothetical 
jobs offered in each choice set
Choice set Students (n= 140) Health workers (n= 211)
1 101 128
2 124 152
3 101 120
4 127 163
5 93 124
6 90 125
7 116 148
8 102 132
9 85 124
10 100 135
11 97 126
12 91 124
13 87 130
14 86 124
15 131 168
16 82 114
17 105 142
18 102 134
19 91 133
20 96 145
21 91 138
22 79 112
23 108 149
24 95 126
25 97 137
Table 6. Mixed logit model main effects, students
Attribute (Mean) Medical students aOR (95% CI) P-value Nursing students aOR  95% CI) P-value
Accessibility and connectivity 1.38 (1.06-1.79) 0.016 1.52 (1.28-1.80) <0.001
Health facility infrastructure 5.94 (3.73-9.47) <0.001 3.54 (2.83-4.58) <0.001
Lodging 2.00 (1.58-2.55) <0.001 1.68 (1.44-1.95) <0.001
Career development 1.81 (1.39-2.37) <0.001 1.88 (1.61-2.20) <0.001
25% rural retention bonus 1.83 (1.33-2.52) <0.001 1.41 (1.14-1.74) 0.001
50% rural retention bonus 3.37 (2.26-5.02) <0.001 1.81 (1.41-2.31) <0.001
75% rural retention bonus 8.27 (5.28-12.96) <0.001 1.80 (1.42-2.29) <0.001
Job assignment to an urban area 2.86 (2.13-3.84) <0.001 2.81 (2.22-3.56) <0.001
SD
Accessibility and connectivity 2.06 (1.55-2.74) <0.001 2.14 (1.65-2.78) <0.001
Health facility Infrastructure 4.22 (2.88-6.20) <0.001 3.38 (2.62-4.37) <0.001
Lodging 0.58 (0.45-0.74) <0.001 1.59 (1.29-1.95) <0.001
Career development 1.73 (1.29-2.30) <0.001 1.89 (1.53-2.32) <0.001
25% rural retention bonus 0.90 (0.59-1.38) 0.626 1.15 (0.87-1.53) 0.324
50% rural retention bonus 1.06 (0.69-1.64) 0.797 0.54 (0.73-1.22) 0.633
75% rural retention bonus 2.48 (1.61-3.82) <0.001 0.47 (0.37-0.60) <0.001
Job assignment to an urban area 2.67 (1.84-3.87) <0.001 3.78 (2.98-4.80) <0.001
Sample n= 45 n= 95
Observations 2,160 4,560
1aOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio, 95% CI= 95% Confidence Interval
Interaction terms for gender, rural upbringing and contract-
based employment status (versus civil servant status) were 
each tested in a single model for each cadre of health workers. 
Among medical doctors, rural upbringing was positively and 
significantly associated with choosing a job in a health facility 
that was accessible to the district capital (aOR= 2.14, CI: 1.21-
3.81, P= 0.009), that had good infrastructure (aOR= 1.76, CI: 
1.31-3.01, P= 0.040), that provided a 25% rural retention bonus 
(aOR= 1.83, CI: 1.09-3.08, P= 0.022), the provided a 75% rural 
retention bonus (aOR= 2.16, CI: 1.13-4.17, P= 0.021) and that 
guaranteed transfer after service in a rural area (aOR= 1.67, CI: 
1.05-2.64, P= 0.029). Female doctors were more likely to choose 
a job with good health facility infrastructure (aOR= 3.71, CI: 
2.00-6.86, P< 0.001) and a job with a 25% rural retention bonus 
(aOR= 2.32, CI: 1.21-4.43, P= 0.011). Doctors with contractual 
appointments were more likely to choose a job with good 
housing (aOR= 2.34, CI: 1.21-4.56, P= 0.011).
Among state registered nurses, rural upbringing was 
positively and significantly associated with choosing a job 
that would provide preferential admission for in-service 
training (aOR= 1.72, CI: 1.06-2.78, P= 0.028). Female gender 
was associated with choosing a job with good health facility 
infrastructure (aOR= 3.71, CI: 2.00-6.86, P< 0.001) and 
with a job with a 25% rural retention bonus (aOR= 2.32, CI: 
1.21-4.43, P= 0.011). State registered nurses with contractual 
appointments were significantly more likely to choose a job 
with good health facility infrastructure, compared to those 
having civil servant status (aOR= 2.35, CI: 1.38-3.99, P= 0.002), 
they were also more likely to choose a job with good housing 
(aOR= 1.67, CI: 1.14-2.45, P= 0.009) and a job that was in 
a health facility that was easily accessible to the district 
headquarter (aOR= 1.59, CI: 1.04-2.41, P= 0.003). Nurse aides 
with contractual appointments were significantly more likely 
to choose a job with good health facility infrastructure when 
compared to those having civil servant status (aOR= 1.91, CI: 
1.14-1.17, P= 0.014). However, they were significantly less likely 
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to choose a job with a 75% rural retention bonus, compared to 
health workers having civil servant status (aOR= 0.45, CI: 0.23-
0.78, P= 0.018). 
Willingness-to-Pay (WTP)
The WTP values in Table 8 show that both medical students 
and nursing students value adequate health facility infrastructure 
the most (86,529 FCFA forgone salary for medical students and 
129,000 FCFA forgone salary for nursing students), followed by 
reassignment to an urban area after completion of 3 years in a 
rural post (58,118 FCFA forgone salary for medical students 
and 125,750 FCFA forgone salary for nursing students). It 
should be noted that the reason forgone salaries for incentive 
mechanisms are lower for medical students than nursing 
students is that medical students valued monetary incentives 
in the form of rural retention bonuses more than nursing 
students. This is most clearly identified in the mixed logit 
model estimates, where the adjusted odds ratio for a 75% rural 
retention bonus is over four times as large for medical students 
compared to nursing students (aOR= 8.27 vs. aOR= 1.80). 
The WTP values in Table 9 show that all health worker cadres 
values health facility infrastructure as the most important 
job attribute for rural job postings, medical doctors valued 
reassignment to urban areas more than twice as high as 
nurses and more than fifteen times as high as nurse aides. 
This supports the idea that medical doctors value urban posts, 
where most secondary and tertiary hospitals are based, much 
higher than lower level cadres whose clinical skills are more 
oriented towards primary care services which are often the 
only type of care provided in rural remote areas. 
Tables 10 and 11 demonstrate predicted preference impact 
(percentage) of retention strategy packages for medical 
students. From these we can infer the following: a) that even 
adding single incentives leads respondents to greatly prefer the 
jobs offered to their current jobs, for example, at the status quo 
level of salary, providing even a single incentive such as good 
housing or preferential admission to in-service training was 
preferred by over 60% of respondents to their current situation, 
b) packages combining incentives are generally preferred over 
singleton incentives. For example, the package combining 
adequate and functional health facility infrastructure, 
reassignment to an urban area after three years, good housing 
and preferential admission for in-service training is preferred 
to the status quo by over 95% of respondents. On the other 
hand, keeping the salary level constant, no single incentive is 
preferred by more than 85% of respondents.
However, this is not always the case, as is seen from Table 11, 
where for every level of salary, medical doctors prefer a job 
package that ensures adequate and functional health facility 
infrastructure over one that provides both good housing and 
preferential admission for in-service training after working for 
4 years in a rural area, and c) for any incentive, the proportion of 
Table 7. Mixed logit model main effects, health workers
Attribute (Mean)
Medical Doctors aOR
(95% CI)
P-value State-Registered urses
aOR (95% CI)
P-value Nurse Aides aOR
(95% CI)
P-value
Accessibility and connectivity 1.59 (1.30-1.95) <0.001 1.34 (1.13-1.60) 0.001 1.33 (1.13-1.57) 0.001
Health Facility Infrastructure 3.76 (2.88-4.90) <0.001 3.56 (2.75-4.60) <0.001 2.90 (2.18-3.83) <0.001
Lodging 2.03 (1.70-2.42) <0.001 1.75 (1.48-2.08) <0.001 1.61 (1.34-1.94) <0.001
Career Development 1.99 (1.66-2.38) <0.001 1.77 (1.45-2.17) <0.001 1.98 (1.55-2.53) <0.001
25% Rural Retention Bonus 1.91 (1.50-2.43) <0.001 1.36 (1.08-1.71) <0.001 1.62 (1.27-2.09) <0.001
50% Rural Retention Bonus 3.36 (2.50-4.51) <0.001 2.31 (1.75-3.03) <0.001 2.66 (1.98-3.57) <0.001
75% Rural Retention Bonus 5.60 (4.12-7.61) <0.001 3.13 (2.43-4.03) <0.001 4.29 (3.11-5.93) <0.001
Job Assignment to an urban area 2.35 (1.90-2.92) <0.001 1.65 (1.32-2.06) <0.001 1.14 (0.97-1.33) 0.107
SD
Accessibility and connectivity 2.27 (1.78-2.89) <0.001 0.53 (0.42-0.66) <0.001 1.39 (1.12-1.73) 0.003
Health Facility Infrastructure 2.85 (2.26-3.59) <0.001 3.24 (2.52-4.17) <0.001 3.79 (2.76-5.20) <0.001
Lodging 1.76 (1.42-2.19) <0.001 1.61 (1.30-2.01) <0.001 1.76 (1.41-2.20) <0.001
Career Development 1.74 (1.43-2.12) <0.001 2.28 (1.80-2.88) <0.001 2.28 (1.80-2.88) <0.001
25% Rural Retention Bonus 0.88 (0.63-1.22) 0.444 0.94 (0.67-1.30) 0.690 0.85 (0.64-1.12) 0.248
50% Rural Retention Bonus 0.98 (0.74-1.30) 0.876 1.01 (0.71-1.45) 0.946 1.17 (0.85-1.62) 0.340
75% Rural Retention Bonus 1.84 (1.36-2.50) <0.001 0.75 (0.46-1.22) 0.250 0.51 (0.38-0.67) <0.001
Job Assignment to an urban area 2.80 (2.12-3.70) <0.001 2.31 (1.82-2.92) <0.001 1.35 (1.09-1.66) 0.005
Sample n= 77 n= 74 n= 60
Observations 3,696 3,552 2,880
1aOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio, 95% CI= 95% Confidence Interval
Table 8. WTP estimates for job attributes, medical and nursing students
Attribute rank
Medical students Nursing students
Attribute FCFA Attribute FCFA
1 Health facility Infrastructure 86,529 Health facility Infrastructure 129,000
2 Job assignment to an urban area 58,118 Job assignment to an urban area 125,750
3 Lodging 41,529 Career development 76,000
4 Career development 25,647 Lodging 68,500
5 Accessibility and connectivity 14,529 Accessibility and connectivity 54,000
WTP= Willingness-to-Pay; FCFA= Franc CFA, the local currency used in Cameroon (500 FCFA= 1 US dollar)
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respondents who prefer a given job to the status quo increases 
with an increase in salary.
Discussion
The majority of DCEs examine job preferences of specific 
cadres of health workers such as nurses (21), nursing students 
(22), medical students (20) or medical students and doctors 
(7). Our study looks at job preferences of a variety of cadres 
represented in the national health system. In particular, in this 
study we examined the preferences of nurse aides who are seen 
as the backbone of primary care service delivery in remote 
and rural areas of the Cameroonian health system. More 
importantly, this study analyzed health workers’ preferences 
for jobs containing attributes that are currently being discussed 
as potential policy mechanisms for rural and remote health 
worker retention by the MoPH. While the sample included 
cannot be guaranteed to be representative of the general health 
worker population in the three regions included in the study, 
and in spite of some limitations to directly inferring WTP 
estimates from parameter estimates as discussed by Lancsar 
et al. (30). The results of this study will provide new evidence 
about the kinds of policies that are likely to be most effective 
in attracting and retaining health workers in rural Cameroon, 
effectively linking research to practice and policy. Below 
Table 9. WTP estimates for job attributes, health workers
Attribute 
rank
Medical doctors State-registered nurses Nurse aides
Attribute FCFA Attribute FCFA Attribute FCFA
1 Health Facility Infrastructure 97,000 Health Facility Infrastructure 97,846 Health Facility Infrastructure 46,480
2 Job Assignment to an urban area 66,462 Lodging 40,846 Career Development 27,080
3 Lodging 56,231 Career Development 38,385 Lodging 18,120
4 Career Development 54,923 Job Assignment to an urban area 27,308 Accessibility and Connectivity of 
workplace to the city
10.560
5 Accessibility and Connectivity 37,385 Accessibility and Connectivity 21,615 Job Assignment to an urban area 3,520
WTP= Willingness-to-Pay; FCFA= Franc CFA, the local currency used in Cameroon (500 FCFA= 1 US dollar)
Table 10. Predicted preference impact (percentage) of retention strategy packages for medical students
Potential retention strategy
Salary increase
+0% +25% +50% +75%
Package A
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure
97.34% 98.64% 99.30% 99.65%
Reassignment to urban area after 3 years in rural post
Provide good housing
Preferential admission for in-service training after 4 years rural service
Package B
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure
95.94% 97.91% 98.93%    99.46%Reassignment to urban area after 3 years in rural post
Provide good housing
Package C
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure
93.21% 96.43% 98.24% 99.07%Provide good housing
Preferential admission for in-service training after 4 years rural service
Package D
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure
92.12% 95.85% 97.85% 98.92%
Reassignment to urban area after 3 years in rural post
Package E
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure
89.82%    94.57% 97.17% 98.57%
Provide good housing
Package F
Reassignment to urban area after 3 years in rural post
89.38%    94.32% 97.04% 98.50%Provide good housing
Preferential admission for in-service training after 4 years rural service
Package G
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure
87.07% 93.00% 96.33% 98.14%
Preferential admission for in-service training after 4 years rural service
Package H
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure 81.32% 89.52% 94.43% 97.10%
Package I
Provide good housing
75.80% 86.08% 92.43% 96.01%
Preferential admission for in-service training after 4 years rural service
Package J
Provide good housing 66.95% 79.97% 88.76% 94.06%
Package K
Preferential admission for in-service training after 4 years rural service 60.73% 75.32%     85.77% 92.36%
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we discuss the results from this study, grouped by attributes 
included in the DCE choice sets.
Connectivity to urban areas
Results from this study show that accessibility and connectivity 
of the health facility to an urban area only has a limited effect 
on determining job selection. This is an encouraging finding 
for two reasons. First, there is little that the MoPH can really 
do to address this contextual factor. Second, it shows that 
respondents consider other attributes when making their job 
selection and will not pick a job solely on the basis of its ‘better’ 
location. In addition, contrary to findings from similar contexts 
(9), those brought up in rural areas (who would be presumed to 
be more used to living in areas with poor connectivity) did not 
show significantly different preferences from those brought 
up in urban areas. It is quite likely that educated rural youth 
(who would tend to be the most ambitious individuals in their 
communities) would not want to return to rural areas after life 
in the city. Further qualitative research is needed to explain this 
result, which diverges from findings in other contexts.
Health facility infrastructure
We found that health workers greatly value adequate health 
facility infrastructure. During the preliminary qualitative 
interviews, respondents often noted that the lack of equipment, 
supplies and drugs, was a key factor in their determination to 
avoid posts in remote areas. Our results consistently show that 
good health facility infrastructure is an important determinant 
of job choice, and is the job attribute that all cadres value 
most based on the WTP estimates. This is particularly true 
for medical students, who are often disappointed by the gap 
between what they have been trained to do, often based in a 
tertiary hospital environment, and the availability of drugs and 
equipment in rural health facilities where they are expected to 
work upon completing their studies. These results are consistent 
with those from other DCEs in Sub-Saharan Africa (22,23). 
Financial incentives
We found that all groups of respondents were responsive to 
higher salaries in the form of a rural retention bonus of 50%–
75% of their base salary. However, it is important to note that, 
in common with Kruk et al. (22) and Blaauw et al. (11), it was 
identified that salary incentives need to be of substantial value 
to attract health workers to remote areas. 
Quota for continued specialty training
Findings from this study suggest that the promise of quotas 
for obtaining specialist training in Cameroon may have only 
a limited effect on improving rural retention. This is both 
surprising, given results from DCEs in other settings such as 
Table 11. Predicted preference impact (percentage) of retention strategy packages for medical doctors
Potential retention strategy
Salary increase
+0% +25% +50% +75%
Package A
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure
97.30% 98.40% 99.00% 99.40%
Reassignment to urban area after 3 years in rural post
Provide good housing
Preferential admission for in-service training after 4 years rural service
Package B
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure
94.60% 96.70% 98.00% 98.80%Reassignment to urban area after 3 years in rural post
Provide good housing
Package C
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure
93.70% 96.20% 97.70% 98.60%Provide good housing
Preferential admission for in-service training after 4 years rural service
Package D
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure
89.30% 93.40% 95.90% 97.60%
Reassignment to urban area after 3 years in rural post
Package E
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure
87.90% 92.50% 95.40% 97.20%
Provide good housing
Package F
Reassignment to urban area after 3 years in rural post
90.90% 94.40% 96.60% 97.90%Provide good housing
Preferential admission for in-service training after 4 years rural service
Package G
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure
87.80% 92.40% 95.30% 97.20%
Preferential admission for in-service training after 4 years rural service
Package H
Ensure adequate and functional health facility infrastructure 77.90% 85.60% 90.90% 94.40%
Package I
Provide good housing
80.90% 87.70% 92.30% 95.30%Preferential admission for in-service training after 4 years rural service
Package J
Provide good housing 67.50% 77.70% 85.50% 90.90%
Package K
Preferential admission for in-service training after 4 years rural service 67.10% 77.50% 85.20% 90.80%
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Tanzania (20), India (6), and Vietnam (7), and unfortunate, as 
offering specialist training is an intervention that is relatively 
easily amenable to policy action by the MoPH. There may 
be a number of reasons for this; however, an important one 
that emerged during qualitative interviews was a lack of belief 
among respondents that the quota would be implemented 
fairly. This highlights the need to build up a perception of 
transparent functioning of the public health system in terms 
of both medical education and job postings. This study also 
highlights the importance of conducting DCEs that provide 
policy-makers with locally relevant information. 
Housing for health professionals
Lack of appropriate housing is often cited as an impediment 
to ensuring an equitable distribution of the health workforce. 
While the housing attribute in this study was found to be 
significant, its effect on job selection remained limited. This 
result suggests that the provision of improved housing can, at 
best, be part of a package of incentives to attract health workers 
to rural areas.
Guaranteed transfer to urban areas
Both students and health workers were more likely to select 
a job that offered an automatic transfer to an urban area 
after fixed length of rural service. Among health workers, it 
was found that medical doctors were most likely to select a 
job based on this attribute. This is not surprising given their 
training at teaching level hospitals and limited exposure 
to the primary healthcare system. There are certain issues 
that would need to be addressed before such a policy can be 
introduced. First, it would be necessary to ensure that there 
are enough health workers to allow for a rotation system to 
be implemented without rupture. Subsequent analysis on 
health worker production rates would need to be conducted 
to assess the feasibility of this policy. Second, the impact of 
frequent rotation of clinical staff given the administrative 
bottlenecks that make human resource management inefficient 
would need to be addressed systemically. The length of rural 
service after which transfer is guaranteed to an urban area 
would need to vary, with quicker transfers for serving at the 
most remote posts. Else there is the risk of marginally-rural 
posts becoming highly coveted by health workers, leading to 
new opportunities for corruption in appointments by health 
administrators. Piloting this strategy in a particular district or 
region would allow for assessment of its viability. The finding 
that those brought up in rural areas were particularly keen on 
an automatic transfer to an urban area after rural service, turns 
on its head the received wisdom that holds that preferential 
training to students from rural areas will greatly mitigate rural 
health worker shortages, due to these students being more 
amenable to staying in the rural area where they grew up. 
Policy implications and conclusions
In order to respond to the severe geographic imbalances 
in health outcomes in Cameroon and improve coverage of 
essential health services, the national health workforce must 
be distributed in a manner that responds to populations’ 
health needs. While DCEs suffer from limitations such as 
making providers choose between two hypothetical options 
and reflecting stated preferences as opposed to actual behavior 
(23), this study contributes significantly to the building a 
policy dialogue based on evidence, which remains a challenge 
in Cameroon where there remains a significant gap in health 
systems research, particularly for human resources for health. 
Based on the findings of this study, health workforce retention 
policies should include a combination of both monetary 
and non-financial incentives. While introducing a system of 
substantial monetary bonuses for rural service (potentially 
in the form of percentage of base salary top-ups as presented 
in this study) may strengthen retention efforts, the package 
would be incomplete without ensuring the provision and 
maintenance of supplies and equipment for the delivery 
of a clearly defined package of basic services. Over 90% of 
doctors and medical students were found to prefer a package 
comprising a substantial rural retention bonus (of  50% or more 
of base salary) with better facilities and equipment (Tables 10 
and 11) over their current job. Prior designing a retention 
strategy package, it would be essential to assess these options 
and their financial implications within the current budgetary 
landscape for health financing in Cameroon. Implementation 
of this policy may be more effective if health facilities were 
first classified according to varying levels of remoteness. A 
more nuanced classification would in turn provide greater 
compensation to those serving in more remote or difficult 
areas. This in turn may reduce health worker efforts to compete 
to work in nominally ‘rural’ areas within commuting distance 
of towns and cities, something that will undermine the ability 
of this incentive to effectively address health worker shortages 
where they are most acute. Beginning with these two measures 
could provide the foundation of developing a package of 
interventions to attract health workers to serve in remote areas 
of Cameroon, an essential step in the country’s march towards 
universal health coverage.
While the primary objective of this study was to identify 
factors that would influence health workers’ decisions to 
accept and stay in rural and remote areas, the applicability of 
the findings require a fundamental change in human resources 
for health management, potentially including the introduction 
of job vacancy announcements with clear job descriptions 
for each post. The DCE methodology assumes that clear job 
descriptions are available and candidates can make informed 
trade-offs. Yet in most Sub-Saharan African countries, 
management of the public sector health workforce is highly 
centralized, with health workers rarely given the option to 
express their preferences for job postings and usually having 
very little information about the location they will be posted. 
These real-life information gaps can contribute negatively on 
attraction and retention outcomes in several ways. First, health 
workers who are stationed to an unknown location may develop 
even before their arrival, a strategy for their reappointment 
in a place they know better. Second, job sites with attractive 
conditions could be rejected due to the lack of publicity of their 
characteristics and lack of information among candidate health 
workers. Thus, in addition to the abovementioned factors 
identified by this study as being influential on health worker 
employment choices, creating a transparent job market with 
clear job descriptions may also contribute to improving rural 
retention outcomes. 
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